Kierkegaard and the Absolute Paradox

Within the center of the Soren Kierkegaard’s anti-Hegelian philosophy we find the concept of the Absolute Paradox. From the beginning of Philosophical Fragments we find Kierkegaard’s so-called “Thought Project” to be bringing into question the age-old Socratic notion of learning as simple recollection of latent ideas, which Hegel brought to completion in his own dialectic of the movement of Spirit. Kierkegaard offers that learning could actually be a real coming to knowledge of the truth that was not there in the person in the first place. But if this is the case then the human could not possibly find the truth on his own because if he does not possess it then he cannot know to seek or not to seek it. Consequently, if one cannot seek the truth, then someone must bring the truth to them, not only the truth, but also, to put it in Kantian terms, the condition of the possibility of knowing the truth. This is because if the truth was presented one would not be able to understand it because of the lack of the knowledge of the truth in one’s own understanding. And finally in light of all of that, Kierkegaard maintains that the person who brings the truth and the condition, the teacher, is to be understood as a sort of savior because he would bring someone from the state of untruth to truth. This teacher also must be the god because no mere human could bear the truth and the condition of the possibility of knowing the truth because of the state of sin that each human finds themselves in because of themselves.

In light of this thought project we are presented with the Absolute Paradox, which begins as the paradox of human thought: the desire to discover that which human thought cannot think. This for Kierkegaard is the unknowable. He then presents this unknowable as God, not that he is trying to demonstrate the existence of God, which he views as not possible because to set out to demonstrate existence is to assume existence (much like Kant), but rather on the contrary showing that demonstrating God’s existence cannot be done making this God, therefore, the unknown with which our paradoxical understanding constantly clashes with. Now it seems that Kierkegaard’s most important step in this is that in order to possibly know anything about this unknown one must first realize that it is absolutely different from the unknown. This difference is not the opposition of “thesis” and “antithesis” of the popular Hegelian philosophy of the day, which Kierkegaard viewed as really offering no distinction at all because of the lack of “distinguishing mark”, but rather a real, ontological difference between humans. This difference is also very, so to speak, rooted in humans themselves and not in the unknown. For Kierkegaard, that which makes us different from the unknown is sin. This utter differentness ties directly into the necessity of the teacher bringing the condition of the possibility of knowing the truth. How would this knowledge of differentness even come to our minds? It surely cannot come from within us. Kierkegaard maintains that God must teach this to us and indeed this God wanted to teach this to us. But how can this God teach us this truth of our difference with him from a state of “untouched” difference and distance? To Kierkegaard he must come to us in a state of equality, so as to understand the difference first hand for himself, so to relay this truth to us as it really is for us. Thus we find the Absolute Paradox: God, who is absolutely different from us, in order to teach us of our absolute difference comes to us in a state of absolute equality with us; the infinite unknowable becomes the finite knowable.

Kierkegaard’s outworking of his thought project mean major implications for the Hegelian notions of the day. Hegel’s Socratic notion that truth is latent in each individual seems to be brought in question by Kierkegaard’s idea that possibility of a real teacher who actually brings the truth and the condition of the possibility of knowing the truth. As Kierkegaard points out this idea seems to pretty well accepted. This also seems evident in some rationalist thinking on innate ideas. If humans are in a state of untruth, then the truth is not present in them in the first place. More importantly it seems that Hegel’s notion of God is seriously brought under attack. Hegel’s idea of God is that Spirit making the course history move in the ultimate show of his dialectic through Abstract Spirit (thesis) becoming a Concrete single human (antithesis) which in turn returns to itself to become Absolute Spirit (synthesis). Thus, it seems, for Hegel that God is not entirely different from humanity, but rather humanity is the result of the movement of Spirit. For Kierkegaard, this is not the case. God is the Absolute Other who, in Christ, becomes Absolute Equal in order to teach of the truth, especially our absolute differentness. Thus the paradox itself stands is opposition to Hegel’s view of God.

Practical Reason and the Summum Bonum

In the wake of the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant slams the door on metaphysical knowledge of the objects of the noumenal realm, we find the Critique of Practical Reason. In this work Kant focuses almost solely on the philosophy of morality and its insight concerning knowledge of the noumenal realm. For Kant, the moral law does not consist in subjective feelings of what one should do because the moment the feeling changes so would the ought, but rather moral law consists solely in an objective universal, specifically its form alone, that one should always do, even in spite of consequences and/or subjective feelings. This is known more succinctly as the Categorical Imperative. For Kant the Categorical Imperative is a priori in nature, not stemming from the a posteriori phenomenal realm, as ethical theories based upon ideas such as utility do, but from that of the noumenal. This is an important concept in the Critique because if the moral law finds its source in the phenomenal then it leaves the human will not free but rather determined by prior causes therefore removing the “oughtness” of the Categorical Imperative for ought implies can, as Kant states, “Freedom and an unconditioned practical law reciprocally imply each other” (29). For Kant the fundamental starting point of the Categorical Imperative is to “act so that the maxim of your will can always at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation” and this is in fact, as mentioned earlier, synthetic a priori based upon pure reason (31-32).

Now a question must be asked, namely, how is it shown that this Categorical Imperative can actually make it necessary that pure reason be practical? It seems that for Kant, the use of pure theoretical reason, while establishing the necessity of the noumenal, left us with absolutely no knowledge of the things contained therein, hence the infamous phenomenal/noumenal split. So, where then the Categorical Imperative? As noted, it is a priori in form, not coming from the world of sense experience, yet it seems clear enough that we certainly have knowledge of it. For Kant the moral law gives us an absolute fact, “which points to a pure world of understanding” (44). Therefore, it seems that, in light of the fact of the Categorical Imperative, we have true knowledge of something that is not based upon the phenomenal world of sense but rather upon the noumenal world which can only be accessible through reason, pure practical reason. Therefore, in the face of the moral law, practical reason seems to be necessary, for apart from it we could not have knowledge of the moral law, of which we clearly have knowledge. It is vitally important to stress the fact that this knowledge cannot come from pure theoretical reason, which is based upon the sensing of the phenomenal world, for if it were it would be a posteriori in nature which, as Kant demonstrated in the Critique of Pure Reason, cannot give rise to knowledge of anything in the noumenal realm, hence the necessity of practical reason. This seems like a reasonable conclusion for Kant to make seeing that in Pure Reason he shut the door to metaphysical knowledge of the noumenal by means of scientific inquiry. Seeing the paradox of knowledge of something not based upon phenomena, practical reason is “necessarily needed.”

From this we can rightfully inquire into Kant’s use of the summum bonum or the highest good. It seems as though this too is a necessary outworking of his use of the Categorical Imperative. It would seem that Kant’s argument is that the summum bonum is the ultimate goal of the moral law. He defines the summum bonum as the highest state of virtue coupled with the highest state of happiness. It is important to note that he seems to place the existence of happiness with the presence of virtue and not the other way around. Once again, as in the case of the Categorical Imperative, the summum bonum is an a priori idea that is gained before experience of the sensible world, (lending itself as evidence for virtue being the cause of happiness) which humans seem to have as the ultimate goal of the there morality by means of the Categorical Imperative. The Categorical Imperative seems almost useless without the existence of the summum bonum because what would the CI be tending towards if it weren’t for the sb? From this idea Kant also postulates the existence of an immortal self that is separate from the sensible phenomenal realm, and therefore part of the noumenal realm. This must be the case, reasons, Kant because the summum bonum cannot be reached here in our lives, so there must be more, an afterlife, so to speak. He also postulates God, saying that the possibility of the summum bonum obtaining is directly linked to the existence of God, the only one capable of rewarding the highest virtue, therefore producing the greatest happiness. This idea Kant links to the doctrine of the Kingdom of God within Christianity.

Distinctions Within Calvinistic Theology

So, here I am again thinking and reading about Calvinism. I am reading a polemic concerning forms of hyper-Calvinism by a self-proclaimed staunch 5 point Calvinist. His reviews and arguments are pretty good I must say. However, I've been noticing a very common trend in Calvinistic theology that is starting to bother me. In one of his closing sections he mentions a common error in hyper-Calvinism concerning the love of God towards the reprobate. According to him, to the hyper-Calvinist, God does not, cannot, and will not ever love the reprobate in any type of way; his only attitude towards them is that of hatred. He rightfully combats this idea as being false. So far so good. However, in combating this false view he brings to the table something within the topic at hand. He begins to makes clear distinctions and differences between the type of love God has for the elect and for the reprobate. He states that God's love for the elect is a redemptive love while his love for the reprobate is a love of compassion. While this is a necessary position he holds in light of his view of election and the atonement, I simply do not see the biblical warrant for the differentiation. In my estimation Scripture seems to point to the fact that God loves all of humanity in the same way (John 3:16, 1 John 2:2). We are all unworthy sinners.

The divisions don't stop there. I've been noticing a growing theological trend to have distinctions in God's will, God's love, God's call, God's grace. All of these doctrines, or maybe more properly, attributes, are being divided between the elect and the reprobate. Different types of the same attribute go to different groups of people. I honestly think that there is simply just too much theological hoop jumping going on when it comes to this. In most cases I don't think it is supported by Scripture in any way. Rather, it is simply the logical outworking of predestination and particular redemption. To the Calvinist, Scripture declares that God even loves the reprobate, however it must be in a different way, a non-redemptive way. Why is this? Not because Scripture declares it. No. He must not love them in any similar fashion; they're not elect. Scripture says that God doesn't will people into eternal destruction; he desires all of humanity to repent. To the Calvinist, if God wants someone to repent he must cause them to repent; so obviously there must be a distinction within God's will, so that he can simultaneously will and not will the destruction of the non-elect. Well Paul says in Acts that God is calling all people everywhere to repentance, but according to the Calvinist if this actually true, in a particular sense, then all would repent. So, what do we do? We divide God's call. There's the effectual call for the elect and the general call for the reprobate. Does Scripture make this distinction? I would have to venture to say no it doesn't. It's simply the logical outworking of, once again, predestination and limited atonement. God can't call the elect and the reprobate in the same because he didn't elect the reprobate to salvation and Christ surely didn't die to redeem them.

I must take an aside at this point to further discuss this idea of effectual versus general call. This, in my mind, is probably the most wretched distinctions made by the Reformed. So, let me get this straight. Before creation, God decided whom he would save and whom he would abandon to destruction. He sent Christ to redeem on those whom he had chosen beforehand. God then calls those whom he chose to salvation. However, he also calls those whom he left for destruction? It interesting that God calls all to repentance and warns that destruction is imminent for those who don't repent, but yet, in essence, he is "calling the shots" in regards to repentance. The reprobate have no choice at all in the matter. They can't repent! God predetermined to withhold repentance from them. So, in this theology, in Acts Paul is essentially saying, "God is calling all people everywhere to repent because he is soon going to judge the world by this one man whom he raised from the dead, but most of you can't repent because before you were born God decided to withhold that gift from you. So, you're not going to repent and you will end in destruction because God predetermined it." I don't care how much explanation any Calvinist can give, he cannot work his way out from this fact: the so-called general call is useless. It has no power. And I think that is the idea. It was never intended to save anyone, much like the rhetoric concerning general versus special revelation. So, God calls the reprobate to repentance with a call that could never save them in the first place? It seems that this division of God's call was simply invented so as to not make God unjust. Would God be just in condemning someone for the sin including that of unbelief (it is after all a sin) if he never called them to belief? Most believers, whether Calvinist or not, would say yes. So there is where this division of the call was concocted. But, to me this seems even more unjust. God calls just so he can "save face", just so no one can say he's unjust. But his call was empty. There was no substance there, none at all! It almost reminds of something like dangling candy over a toddler and them jerking it away from them because you never intended on giving it to them.

I am becoming perplexed at all of these distinctions. I beg for solid exegetical support of these, especially the two "calls". We must strive to understand God more and more. We must strive rightly divide the word of truth.

Reverse Cosmological Argument

I was reading an interesting atheistic site and I stumbled upon an interesting argument for the non-existence of God. It goes as such:

If the universe is "everything that exists," and it could be created, then, whatever entity could create the universe, would be outside that universe. It follows, then, that such an entity would be outside "everything that exists." An entity "outside" existence does not exist! A non-existent entity cannot do anything. Creation is an action that an entity must perform; it cannot be performed if the entity that would perform it does not exist!

This is an interesting argument indeed. It seems like it may have some truth behind it. However, I think it falls fatally short of its intended purpose, to prove a deity does not exist, mainly by way of a type of reverse cosmological argument.

The first main problem I find with this argument is in its first premise. It assumes that existence can be achieved only within the bounds of this universe. In the realm of the scientific community there is debate about whether or not our universe is the only one there is. Could there be another universe? I honestly don't think that there is, but it's obvious it's not a settled issue in everyone's mind. Plus there is the argument from multiple dimensions. We here on planet earth are bound by 3 spatial dimensions and one (I think it is properly 1/2) dimension of time. However, there are at least 11 dimension to our universe, and some theorist theorize a 12th and a 13th. So, it is entirely possible that things exist that we can have no recognizable interaction with, in our own universe. So it doesn't seem true that existence is only attained within the bounds of the universe. And even if it is our 3-D knowledge of the universe is too limited to be making negative universal claims.

It seems that this argument plays very heavily off of the phrase "everything that exists" and that "everything" being the universe. The flaw of this argument is that it is fatally circular in it's logic. It basically assumes the non-existence of God to prove it. As stated earlier, there is no actual evidence that existence is dependent upon being within the bounds of our universe. The argument is set up so that it really can't be falsifiable.

These are just a few of my initial thoughts on this particular argument and I've not tried to be all inclusive in my assessment, although I probably will at some point in the future.

My New Endeavor

Lately my life has been immensely immersed in the gospel. Not that before I wasn't focused on it, I have been contemplating the true meaning of the gospel. What is the gospel, really? It seems in Christianity, especially Western Reformed Christianity, that the gospel is boiled down into one of two things. The gospel is either the tenets of Calvinism, as so famously written by Charles Spurgeon, "It is a nickname to call it Calvinism; Calvinism is the gospel, and nothing else" or it is free justification be faith alone. If you have read any of my previous posts concerning Calvinism you probably know that I am quite suspect of the first statement. But I am also suspect of the second idea as well. It's not that I in any way disagree with justification by faith, although I think it has been misdefined by the Reformers. It is that I don't think that justification is the essence of the gospel of Jesus Christ. If justification is indeed the very core and essence of the gospel, why is it a predominant them in only two Pauline letters? I believe to boil the gospel down to any system of soteriology or any one doctrine is to greatly misunderstand the true nature of the gospel.

In my contemplation over the last few months I have decided to start an endeavor to begin extensively writing on the topic of the gospel of Christ. In this writing I hope to answer the questions of what the gospel is and what the gospel is not. It's not that there are any inherent problems with what people call the gospel; it is the fact that they are not truly the gospel. I find that people call the implications and results of the gospel the gospel. They confuse the implications with the substance. Over the next few months I will be attempting, in between class, work, and life, to put together a book concerning this topic. My reasoning for doing this is that I believe the gospel to be the single most important thing in our lives, indeed, in the entire world. The apostles were willing to die for it, so it must have great significance. If it is that important it is important that it be defined in the proper way for what it really is. I believe that while our salvation is a monumental implication and indeed result of the gospel, it is not necessarily the essence of the gospel. At the core of Paul's theology is the gospel of God concerning his Son. The gospel is all about Christ. It is all about his death and resurrection. It is the proclamation of the true Lord of the world. Like the line in the David Crowder song, "Here is our King". This is the topic that I will be wrestling with and writing about over the next few months. Hopefully through my task, we will realize that the gospel truly is the power that will change our lives.

Paul and Romans 9-11

In the history of Christianity there seems to be no more controversial passages of Scripture other than Romans 9-11. For Calvinists this is a favorite proof text for many key doctrines such as unconditional election, unconditional damnation (dually called double predestination), and the denial of any human will in salvation. For non-Calvinists this passage has always seemed to present itself as a problem because of what seems to the undeniable truth that seems to affirm the doctrines that so many non-Calvinists reject. What then is Paul's purpose of Romans 9-11? Is this passage essential to the book of Romans or is it simply an after thought or a tangent? How does this passage fit into the whole of salvation history in the book of Romans and into the entire canon of Scripture?

I believe that this so hotly debated dichotomy can be cleared up with relatively little blood shed. Simply put, in the spirit of the New Perspective, those of the strict Reformed tradition have taken this passage completely and utterly out of its original Pauline context. Romans 9 is typically cited, in the name of Reformed Orthodoxy, to uphold such doctrines as those listed in the above paragraph. It does the passage great harm to quote it to support such ideas anywhere in the realm of individual salvation/condemnation/election. The surrounding context supports no such ideas. If one would simply read the entire passage he or she would find that Paul is speaking of his great pain that his ethnic brothers, the Israelites have rejected their long awaited Messiah, the Messiah he at first rejected as well. From Paul’s writing we can gather that many were probably wondering if God’s promises concerning Israel were simply no longer going to be fulfilled. Paul is quick to answer this question. “But it is not as though the word of God has failed. For not all who are descended from Israel belong to Israel, and not all are children of Abraham because they are his offspring, but ‘Through Isaac shall your offspring be named’” (Rom. 9.6-7). If one reads the entire thought of Romans 9 with this in mind it is clear that the classic Calvinistic proof texts quickly becomes quite another thing for Paul. He is simply demonstrating that God’s Word has not failed; he has not broken his promise but fulfilled it. “And not only so, but also when Rebekah had conceived children by one man, our forefather Isaac, though they were not yet born and had done nothing either good or bad--in order that God's purpose of election might continue, not because of works but because of him who calls"(Rom. 9.10-11). It is clear from context that God’s purpose of election has nothing to do with his supposed arbitrary choice of individuals for salvation, but rather his election of the nation Israel has indeed been upheld in the death and resurrection of her Messiah.

Chapters 10 and 11 also continue to deal with the same topic. Has God failed in his promises to the nation of Israel? “For, being ignorant of the righteousness of God, and seeking to establish their own, they did not submit to God's righteousness” (Rom. 10.3). NT Wright, in his book What Saint Paul Really Said, describes “the righteousness of God” not as something that God gives to believers, but rather God’s own justice towards his covenant promises. I would have to whole heartedly agree with his definition. Paul is clear then that Israel did not realize God’s own righteousness/faithfulness in what he was doing with them. They had molded God’s covenant into something it was not, namely, their ethnocentric view of justification. Paul is clear here that faith is the “badge”, so to speak, of vindication, not the Law. Paul sums up chapter 10 with his quote of the prophet Isaiah, “I have been found by those who did not seek me; I have shown myself to those who did not ask for me.” God’s purpose of his covenant with Israel was not just for them, but so that the entire human race would be offered membership in the covenant. Chapter 11 is simply Paul’s rhetoric to prove this point further. One must only look to the illustration of the grafted branches to see this demonstrated.

So what then is this passage's purpose? It seems as though Paul uses this passage as a key premise in his argument against the ethnocentric obsession with the Law that Israel had. They had defined the covenant on their own terms. They had their own things they wanted to get out of it. But were their desires and God’s desires on the same plain? Obviously they were not. Paul’s purpose was to show that God had not failed in his promises to Abraham, namely that he would be the father of a family that would be characterized by faith. The answer to the question of whether or not this passage is essential is a resounding “YES”. God had now fulfilled his promises. He had now broken down the walls between the Jews and Gentiles and created a family characterized by faith through the faithfulness of the Messiah. And concerning this passage’s place in salvation history: it is right at the center. It is not to be understood as a free floating passage about how God elected some individuals and damned the rest, but as a premise in Paul’s argument that God is faithful to his promises. He was shown to be faithful in reversing the power unleashed in the world by Adam’s sin, by means of the death of his Son. He was shown to be faithful in his promise to Abraham to create a world wide faith family, which he did by the faithfulness of his Son. Paul’s point is simple: above all things, God is faithful.

The "U" in Tulip -- "Unconditional Election" Part 1

In the previous post concerning Total Depravity I believe it was shown that although man is totally depraved because of sin, he is not totally unable to respond to God. From the Calvinist understanding of doctrine of the Total Depravity naturally flows the doctrine of Unconditional Election. To sum it up, this doctrine is the idea that since man cannot in any way respond to God apart from God actively making him respond God must then select who will and will not be saved apart from anything in the person. In light of the notion of total inability this makes perfect sense, but do we have reason to believe that 1) unconditional election is clearly supported by Scripture and 2) does it make sense of God's revealed nature?

To answer these questions we first must define the term unconditional election. As defined by the always trustworthy Wikipedia, we find, "Unconditional election is the Calvinist teaching that before God created the world, he chose to save some people according to his own purposes and apart from any conditions related to those persons". So before God actualized the world in which we currently live, he, in his foreknowledge of the Fall, chose out a people for himself with no regard to the individuals, thereby choosing to pass over the rest of humanity. I think that this is a fair definition of election as the Calvinists see it.

First, we must ask does this view of election match what the Scripture says about election. Well of course those of the strict Reformed tradition believe that it does, but does it really? Of course in dealing with this issue we must look at the beloved proof text that its proponents claim closes the case on the issue. This passage is of course Romans 9. For me this text does not present that much of a problem simply because I hold to an interpretation of Romans that leans more towards the New Perspective, meaning that the theme of the book is not so much about individual justification, while its presence is evident, but more about the issue of the two people groups, Jews and Gentiles. And in Romans 9 the more immediate context seems to be that of the salvation of the Jews who do not believe. It simply seems to me that Romans 9:15-23 is often stripped of its surrounding context simply to prove unconditional election rather than the text proving the doctrine itself. The first 14 verses of the chapter seem to be referring to the issue of the whole nation of Israel, as do the last 9 verses. It simply only makes sense that verses in between refer to the same subject, the nation of Israel, not individual souls that God preselected. So what is Paul trying to say if he is not talking about unconditional election? I believe the thesis to be: God has now made it clear that salvation is for both Jew and Gentile alike. This passage is honestly very hard to interpret because we have been forced to interpret it in the lens of Calvinism, but in context it clearly is not referring to unconditional election.

Calvinist also point out Romans 8:29 as proof of biblical support for unconditional election. However, this point simply cannot be made with any reasonable interpretation. "For those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, in order that he might be the firstborn among many brothers." Calvinists are quick to point out that this passage says that God definitely does predestine people. And I have to say that I totally agree. But my definition of predestination differs greatly from most Calvinists. I honestly get my definition of predestination directly from the text itself. Predestined to what? Christians are predestined to be conformed to Christ's image. Not to salvation. This text actually does more for the Arminian doctrine of conditional election base upon foreknowledge. "Those whom he foreknew..." Regardless of that, the case simply cannot be made, from this text, that God predestines individuals to eternal life or eternal damnation.

I believe that the most devastating biblical argument against unconditional election comes from 1 Peter 1:1&2. Here in this opening passage of Peter's first letter he explicitly states that election is "according to the foreknowledge of the Father." There is simply no way to ignore this passage when the issue of election comes to the table. The most simple and obvious reading of this passage is that God's election is somehow based upon his foreknowledge of something. The text, however, does not give any details as to what that something is. This text also does not demand that election took place before creation simply because it is based on God's foreknowledge. It could be that God simply foreknows who will repent in faith and they become the elect at that moment. Regardless, this Scripture simply gives no credence to the doctrine of unconditional election.

More next time on the other arguments.