Kierkegaard and the Absolute Paradox

Within the center of the Soren Kierkegaard’s anti-Hegelian philosophy we find the concept of the Absolute Paradox. From the beginning of Philosophical Fragments we find Kierkegaard’s so-called “Thought Project” to be bringing into question the age-old Socratic notion of learning as simple recollection of latent ideas, which Hegel brought to completion in his own dialectic of the movement of Spirit. Kierkegaard offers that learning could actually be a real coming to knowledge of the truth that was not there in the person in the first place. But if this is the case then the human could not possibly find the truth on his own because if he does not possess it then he cannot know to seek or not to seek it. Consequently, if one cannot seek the truth, then someone must bring the truth to them, not only the truth, but also, to put it in Kantian terms, the condition of the possibility of knowing the truth. This is because if the truth was presented one would not be able to understand it because of the lack of the knowledge of the truth in one’s own understanding. And finally in light of all of that, Kierkegaard maintains that the person who brings the truth and the condition, the teacher, is to be understood as a sort of savior because he would bring someone from the state of untruth to truth. This teacher also must be the god because no mere human could bear the truth and the condition of the possibility of knowing the truth because of the state of sin that each human finds themselves in because of themselves.

In light of this thought project we are presented with the Absolute Paradox, which begins as the paradox of human thought: the desire to discover that which human thought cannot think. This for Kierkegaard is the unknowable. He then presents this unknowable as God, not that he is trying to demonstrate the existence of God, which he views as not possible because to set out to demonstrate existence is to assume existence (much like Kant), but rather on the contrary showing that demonstrating God’s existence cannot be done making this God, therefore, the unknown with which our paradoxical understanding constantly clashes with. Now it seems that Kierkegaard’s most important step in this is that in order to possibly know anything about this unknown one must first realize that it is absolutely different from the unknown. This difference is not the opposition of “thesis” and “antithesis” of the popular Hegelian philosophy of the day, which Kierkegaard viewed as really offering no distinction at all because of the lack of “distinguishing mark”, but rather a real, ontological difference between humans. This difference is also very, so to speak, rooted in humans themselves and not in the unknown. For Kierkegaard, that which makes us different from the unknown is sin. This utter differentness ties directly into the necessity of the teacher bringing the condition of the possibility of knowing the truth. How would this knowledge of differentness even come to our minds? It surely cannot come from within us. Kierkegaard maintains that God must teach this to us and indeed this God wanted to teach this to us. But how can this God teach us this truth of our difference with him from a state of “untouched” difference and distance? To Kierkegaard he must come to us in a state of equality, so as to understand the difference first hand for himself, so to relay this truth to us as it really is for us. Thus we find the Absolute Paradox: God, who is absolutely different from us, in order to teach us of our absolute difference comes to us in a state of absolute equality with us; the infinite unknowable becomes the finite knowable.

Kierkegaard’s outworking of his thought project mean major implications for the Hegelian notions of the day. Hegel’s Socratic notion that truth is latent in each individual seems to be brought in question by Kierkegaard’s idea that possibility of a real teacher who actually brings the truth and the condition of the possibility of knowing the truth. As Kierkegaard points out this idea seems to pretty well accepted. This also seems evident in some rationalist thinking on innate ideas. If humans are in a state of untruth, then the truth is not present in them in the first place. More importantly it seems that Hegel’s notion of God is seriously brought under attack. Hegel’s idea of God is that Spirit making the course history move in the ultimate show of his dialectic through Abstract Spirit (thesis) becoming a Concrete single human (antithesis) which in turn returns to itself to become Absolute Spirit (synthesis). Thus, it seems, for Hegel that God is not entirely different from humanity, but rather humanity is the result of the movement of Spirit. For Kierkegaard, this is not the case. God is the Absolute Other who, in Christ, becomes Absolute Equal in order to teach of the truth, especially our absolute differentness. Thus the paradox itself stands is opposition to Hegel’s view of God.

Practical Reason and the Summum Bonum

In the wake of the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant slams the door on metaphysical knowledge of the objects of the noumenal realm, we find the Critique of Practical Reason. In this work Kant focuses almost solely on the philosophy of morality and its insight concerning knowledge of the noumenal realm. For Kant, the moral law does not consist in subjective feelings of what one should do because the moment the feeling changes so would the ought, but rather moral law consists solely in an objective universal, specifically its form alone, that one should always do, even in spite of consequences and/or subjective feelings. This is known more succinctly as the Categorical Imperative. For Kant the Categorical Imperative is a priori in nature, not stemming from the a posteriori phenomenal realm, as ethical theories based upon ideas such as utility do, but from that of the noumenal. This is an important concept in the Critique because if the moral law finds its source in the phenomenal then it leaves the human will not free but rather determined by prior causes therefore removing the “oughtness” of the Categorical Imperative for ought implies can, as Kant states, “Freedom and an unconditioned practical law reciprocally imply each other” (29). For Kant the fundamental starting point of the Categorical Imperative is to “act so that the maxim of your will can always at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation” and this is in fact, as mentioned earlier, synthetic a priori based upon pure reason (31-32).

Now a question must be asked, namely, how is it shown that this Categorical Imperative can actually make it necessary that pure reason be practical? It seems that for Kant, the use of pure theoretical reason, while establishing the necessity of the noumenal, left us with absolutely no knowledge of the things contained therein, hence the infamous phenomenal/noumenal split. So, where then the Categorical Imperative? As noted, it is a priori in form, not coming from the world of sense experience, yet it seems clear enough that we certainly have knowledge of it. For Kant the moral law gives us an absolute fact, “which points to a pure world of understanding” (44). Therefore, it seems that, in light of the fact of the Categorical Imperative, we have true knowledge of something that is not based upon the phenomenal world of sense but rather upon the noumenal world which can only be accessible through reason, pure practical reason. Therefore, in the face of the moral law, practical reason seems to be necessary, for apart from it we could not have knowledge of the moral law, of which we clearly have knowledge. It is vitally important to stress the fact that this knowledge cannot come from pure theoretical reason, which is based upon the sensing of the phenomenal world, for if it were it would be a posteriori in nature which, as Kant demonstrated in the Critique of Pure Reason, cannot give rise to knowledge of anything in the noumenal realm, hence the necessity of practical reason. This seems like a reasonable conclusion for Kant to make seeing that in Pure Reason he shut the door to metaphysical knowledge of the noumenal by means of scientific inquiry. Seeing the paradox of knowledge of something not based upon phenomena, practical reason is “necessarily needed.”

From this we can rightfully inquire into Kant’s use of the summum bonum or the highest good. It seems as though this too is a necessary outworking of his use of the Categorical Imperative. It would seem that Kant’s argument is that the summum bonum is the ultimate goal of the moral law. He defines the summum bonum as the highest state of virtue coupled with the highest state of happiness. It is important to note that he seems to place the existence of happiness with the presence of virtue and not the other way around. Once again, as in the case of the Categorical Imperative, the summum bonum is an a priori idea that is gained before experience of the sensible world, (lending itself as evidence for virtue being the cause of happiness) which humans seem to have as the ultimate goal of the there morality by means of the Categorical Imperative. The Categorical Imperative seems almost useless without the existence of the summum bonum because what would the CI be tending towards if it weren’t for the sb? From this idea Kant also postulates the existence of an immortal self that is separate from the sensible phenomenal realm, and therefore part of the noumenal realm. This must be the case, reasons, Kant because the summum bonum cannot be reached here in our lives, so there must be more, an afterlife, so to speak. He also postulates God, saying that the possibility of the summum bonum obtaining is directly linked to the existence of God, the only one capable of rewarding the highest virtue, therefore producing the greatest happiness. This idea Kant links to the doctrine of the Kingdom of God within Christianity.

Paul and Romans 9-11

In the history of Christianity there seems to be no more controversial passages of Scripture other than Romans 9-11. For Calvinists this is a favorite proof text for many key doctrines such as unconditional election, unconditional damnation (dually called double predestination), and the denial of any human will in salvation. For non-Calvinists this passage has always seemed to present itself as a problem because of what seems to the undeniable truth that seems to affirm the doctrines that so many non-Calvinists reject. What then is Paul's purpose of Romans 9-11? Is this passage essential to the book of Romans or is it simply an after thought or a tangent? How does this passage fit into the whole of salvation history in the book of Romans and into the entire canon of Scripture?

I believe that this so hotly debated dichotomy can be cleared up with relatively little blood shed. Simply put, in the spirit of the New Perspective, those of the strict Reformed tradition have taken this passage completely and utterly out of its original Pauline context. Romans 9 is typically cited, in the name of Reformed Orthodoxy, to uphold such doctrines as those listed in the above paragraph. It does the passage great harm to quote it to support such ideas anywhere in the realm of individual salvation/condemnation/election. The surrounding context supports no such ideas. If one would simply read the entire passage he or she would find that Paul is speaking of his great pain that his ethnic brothers, the Israelites have rejected their long awaited Messiah, the Messiah he at first rejected as well. From Paul’s writing we can gather that many were probably wondering if God’s promises concerning Israel were simply no longer going to be fulfilled. Paul is quick to answer this question. “But it is not as though the word of God has failed. For not all who are descended from Israel belong to Israel, and not all are children of Abraham because they are his offspring, but ‘Through Isaac shall your offspring be named’” (Rom. 9.6-7). If one reads the entire thought of Romans 9 with this in mind it is clear that the classic Calvinistic proof texts quickly becomes quite another thing for Paul. He is simply demonstrating that God’s Word has not failed; he has not broken his promise but fulfilled it. “And not only so, but also when Rebekah had conceived children by one man, our forefather Isaac, though they were not yet born and had done nothing either good or bad--in order that God's purpose of election might continue, not because of works but because of him who calls"(Rom. 9.10-11). It is clear from context that God’s purpose of election has nothing to do with his supposed arbitrary choice of individuals for salvation, but rather his election of the nation Israel has indeed been upheld in the death and resurrection of her Messiah.

Chapters 10 and 11 also continue to deal with the same topic. Has God failed in his promises to the nation of Israel? “For, being ignorant of the righteousness of God, and seeking to establish their own, they did not submit to God's righteousness” (Rom. 10.3). NT Wright, in his book What Saint Paul Really Said, describes “the righteousness of God” not as something that God gives to believers, but rather God’s own justice towards his covenant promises. I would have to whole heartedly agree with his definition. Paul is clear then that Israel did not realize God’s own righteousness/faithfulness in what he was doing with them. They had molded God’s covenant into something it was not, namely, their ethnocentric view of justification. Paul is clear here that faith is the “badge”, so to speak, of vindication, not the Law. Paul sums up chapter 10 with his quote of the prophet Isaiah, “I have been found by those who did not seek me; I have shown myself to those who did not ask for me.” God’s purpose of his covenant with Israel was not just for them, but so that the entire human race would be offered membership in the covenant. Chapter 11 is simply Paul’s rhetoric to prove this point further. One must only look to the illustration of the grafted branches to see this demonstrated.

So what then is this passage's purpose? It seems as though Paul uses this passage as a key premise in his argument against the ethnocentric obsession with the Law that Israel had. They had defined the covenant on their own terms. They had their own things they wanted to get out of it. But were their desires and God’s desires on the same plain? Obviously they were not. Paul’s purpose was to show that God had not failed in his promises to Abraham, namely that he would be the father of a family that would be characterized by faith. The answer to the question of whether or not this passage is essential is a resounding “YES”. God had now fulfilled his promises. He had now broken down the walls between the Jews and Gentiles and created a family characterized by faith through the faithfulness of the Messiah. And concerning this passage’s place in salvation history: it is right at the center. It is not to be understood as a free floating passage about how God elected some individuals and damned the rest, but as a premise in Paul’s argument that God is faithful to his promises. He was shown to be faithful in reversing the power unleashed in the world by Adam’s sin, by means of the death of his Son. He was shown to be faithful in his promise to Abraham to create a world wide faith family, which he did by the faithfulness of his Son. Paul’s point is simple: above all things, God is faithful.

Molinism and the Doctrine of Middle Knowledge

Ah, the age old question: how in the world can the sovereignty of God possibly be reconciled with the free will of man. From this question flows many implications and schools of thought. The most obvious of these would be the Calvinism vs. Arminianism debate that has been raging since the time of the reformation. With this debate comes questions such as, "How does God 'elect'"? "What role does his foreknowledge play in election"? "Does man have a free choice in salvation"? "Does God predetermine who would be saved and those who would be damned"? And the list goes on and on.

How does this "election" take place? Did God capriciously choose some people for heaven and others for hell before the beginning of time, like the Calvinist say? Or did God choose people by looking into the future to see who would freely choose him, as classical Arminianism states? Or, even more, is Christ the "elect" and anyone found in him by virtue is also the elect?

There is one system of thought that I have come to respect and am almost ready to accept. This system of thought is called Molinism. Molinism goes as such:

--God's natural knowledge. (includes necessities and possibilities ex: what could be)
--God's middle knowledge (including counterfactuals ex: what would be in "any fully specified, freedom-permitting set of circumstances" quote from William Lane Craig)
--God's decree to create the universe (decision of actualization)
--God's free knowledge (reality of the actual universe)

It is important to note that these are not chronological steps of progression rather they are logical steps of progression. God has had the fullness of all knowledge from eternity.

Most all Christians accept the two classical realms of free and natural knowledge. Molinism is unique in that it affirms the additional realm of middle knowledge. Middle knowledge is not something that is foreign to the Scriptures. "And you, Capernaum, will you be exalted to heaven? You will be brought down to Hades. For if the mighty works done in you had been done in Sodom, it would have remained until this day" (Matt. 11.23). In this we find that Jesus possessed the knowledge of counterfactuals or what would have been in a different set of circumstances. Other passages that affirm this fact are 1 Samuel 23:6-10, Matthew 17:27, and John 21:6. In order for the knowledge of counterfactuals to actually be considered middle knowledge it has to come logically prior to the creation decree. It makes logical sense that this knowledge should come prior to the decree of creation. The logical progression goes from knowledge of what could be to knowledge of what would be then to the knowledge of what will be. This progression just seems to fit the natural laws of logic in this type of progression. Therefore, there is good reasons to believe that God indeed does possess the knowledge of counterfactuals that can be considered middle knowledge by virtue of it's logical place before the decree of creation. It, therefore, follows that God "consulted" his middle knowledge to "inform" his decree of creation. This would, therefore, solve the problem of divine foreknowledge and human free will. Another facet of Molinism is that God, through his middle knowledge, has "elected" only those who would have freely chosen him in any possible world. The lost are the souls who do not accept the call of the Spirit of God in this world are the souls who would not accept this call in any possible circumstance in any possible world. This, to me, simply makes logical sense. If, people do not accept the call to salvation in this world, they would not accept it in any other world.

While, this system of thought is difficult to understand at times, I believe that it makes sense of the seeming contradiction between divine foreknowledge and human free will along with the divine election of the saints.